Ryan Jablonski

@article{JablonskiInfo,
  title={What politicians don't know can hurt you: The effects of information on politicians' spending decisions},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Seim, Brigitte},
 journal={American Political Science Review},
pages={1-21},
  year={2023},
  publisher={Cambridge University Press},
abstract={Do well-informed politicians make more effective public spending decisions? In experiments with almost all (N=460) elected politicians in Malawi, we tested the effects of information on public spending by providing information about school needs, foreign aid and voting prior to real spending decisions. We show that this intervention reduced inequalities in public spending: treatment group politicians were more likely to spend in schools neglected by donors and more likely to spend in schools at the highest quartile of need. Treatment effects were often greatest in remote and less populated communities. The effect of some treatments also increased when politicians were told that they were being observed by voters or donors, suggesting that greater transparency increases demand for accurate information. These results provide a novel explanation for inequalities in spending and imply social welfare benefits from improving politicians' access to and demand for information about community needs.},
url_Paper={https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423001132},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={https://osf.io/xj72z/},
url_Data={https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S}
}

Do well-informed politicians make more effective public spending decisions? In experiments with almost all (N=460) elected politicians in Malawi, we tested the effects of information on public spending by providing information about school needs, foreign aid and voting prior to real spending decisions. We show that this intervention reduced inequalities in public spending: treatment group politicians were more likely to spend in schools neglected by donors and more likely to spend in schools at the highest quartile of need. Treatment effects were often greatest in remote and less populated communities. The effect of some treatments also increased when politicians were told that they were being observed by voters or donors, suggesting that greater transparency increases demand for accurate information. These results provide a novel explanation for inequalities in spending and imply social welfare benefits from improving politicians' access to and demand for information about community needs.

@article{jablonski2021individualized,
  title={Individualized text messages about public services fail to sway voters: evidence from a field experiment on Ugandan elections},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan S and Buntaine, Mark T and Nielson, Daniel L and Pickering, Paula M},
  journal={Journal of Experimental Political Science},
  pages={1-13},
  year={2021},
  publisher={Cambridge University Press},
abstract={Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior..},
url_Publication={https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2021.15},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/Vote_Choice_Public_Services.pdf},
url_Data={https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VL4UTZ},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615}
}

Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior..

@article{seim2020information,
  title={How information about foreign aid affects public spending decisions: Evidence from a field experiment in Malawi},
  author={Seim, Brigitte and Jablonski, Ryan and Ahlback, Johan},
  journal={Journal of Development Economics},
  year={2020},
abstract={Does foreign aid shift public spending? Many worry that aid will be "fungible'' in the sense that governments reallocate public funds in response to aid. If so, this could undermine development, increase the poorest’s dependency on donors, and free resources for patronage. Yet, there is little agreement about the scale or consequences of such effects. We conducted an experiment with 460 elected politicians in Malawi. We provided information about foreign aid projects in local schools to these politicians. Afterwards, politicians made real decisions about which schools to target with development goods. Politicians who received the aid information treatment were 18\% less likely to target schools with existing aid. These effects increase to 22-29\% when the information was plausibly novel. We find little evidence that aid information heightens targeting of political supporters or family members, or dampens support to the neediest. Instead, the evidence indicates politicians allocate the development goods in line with equity concerns.},
url_Publication={https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102522},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://aiddata.org/publications/how-information-about-foreign-aid-affects-public-spending-decisions-evidence-from-a-field-experiment-in-malawi},
url_Data={https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GMQUAQ},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/XJ72Z}
}

Does foreign aid shift public spending? Many worry that aid will be "fungible'' in the sense that governments reallocate public funds in response to aid. If so, this could undermine development, increase the poorest’s dependency on donors, and free resources for patronage. Yet, there is little agreement about the scale or consequences of such effects. We conducted an experiment with 460 elected politicians in Malawi. We provided information about foreign aid projects in local schools to these politicians. Afterwards, politicians made real decisions about which schools to target with development goods. Politicians who received the aid information treatment were 18% less likely to target schools with existing aid. These effects increase to 22-29% when the information was plausibly novel. We find little evidence that aid information heightens targeting of political supporters or family members, or dampens support to the neediest. Instead, the evidence indicates politicians allocate the development goods in line with equity concerns.

@incollection{buntaine2019budgets,
  title={Budgets, SMS Texts and Voting in Uganda},
  author={Buntaine, Mark and Bush, Sarah and Jablonski, Ryan and Neilson, Dan and Pickering, Paula},
  booktitle={Information, Accountability and Cumulative Learning},
  year={2019},
  publisher={Cambridge University Press},
abstract={},
url_Publication={https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/information-accountability-and-cumulative-learning/45DD58C16ED29DFFA9D69F0CF740EFB4},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102151/},
url_Data={https://github.com/egap/metaketa-i},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615}
}

@article{dunning2019voter,
  title={Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials},
  author={Dunning, Thad and Grossman, Guy and Humphreys, Macartan and Hyde, Susan D and McIntosh, Craig and Nellis, Gareth and Adida, Claire L and Arias, Eric and Bicalho, Clara and Boas, Taylor C and others},
  journal={Science advances},
  volume={5},
  number={7},
  year={2019},
abstract={Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.},
url_Publication={https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/7/eaaw2612},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/736},
url_Data={https://github.com/egap/metaketa-i}
}

Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.

@article{hafner2018surviving,
  title={Surviving elections: Election violence, incumbent victory and post-election repercussions},
  author={Hafner-Burton, Emilie M and Hyde, Susan D and Jablonski, Ryan S},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  volume={48},
  number={2},
  pages={459-488},
  year={2018},
abstract={It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.},
url_Publication={https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600020X},
url_Ungated_Paper={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/Surviving%20Elections.pdf},
url_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/BJPS%20Replication2.zip}
}

It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.

@article{buntaine2018sms,
  title={SMS texts on corruption help Ugandan voters hold elected councillors accountable at the polls},
  author={Buntaine, Mark T and Jablonski, Ryan and Nielson, Daniel L and Pickering, Paula M},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume={115},
  number={26},
  pages={6668-6673},
  year={2018},
url_Publication={http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2018/06/05/1722306115},
url_Data={https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/T1DDVF},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615},
abstract={Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior.}

}

Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior.

@article{oliver2017tortuga,
  title={The Tortuga disease: the perverse effects of illicit foreign capital},
  author={Oliver, Steven and Jablonski, Ryan and Hastings, Justin V},
  journal={International Studies Quarterly},
  volume={61},
  number={2},
  pages={312-327},
  year={2017},
abstract={},
url_Publication={https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqw051/3850831/The-Tortuga-Disease-The-Perverse-Effects-of?redirectedFrom=fulltext},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233959},
url_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/Oliver%20Jablonski%20Hastings%20Replication.zip},
url_SI={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/tortuga-supplementary-appendices.pdf}
}

@article{gibson2015did,
  title={Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa's Transitions},
  author={Gibson, Clark C and Hoffman, Barak D. and Jablonski, Ryan S.},
  journal={World Development},
  year={2015},
abstract={Did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in Africa in the 1990s? We argue that after the Cold War, donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage. To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. We test our theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization.},
url_Publication={http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X14003581},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/did-aid-promote-democracy-in-africa.pdf},
url_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/Gibson+Hoffman+Jablonski+WD+Replication.zip}

}

Did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in Africa in the 1990s? We argue that after the Cold War, donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage. To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. We test our theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization.

@article{hafner2014governments,
  title={When do governments resort to election violence?},
  author={Hafner-Burton, Emilie M and Hyde, Susan D and Jablonski, Ryan S},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  volume={44},
  number={1},
  pages={149-179},
  year={2014},
  publisher={Cambridge University Press},
abstract={When are governments most likely to use election violence, and what factors can mitigate government incentives to resort to violence? How do the dynamics of election violence differ in the pre- and post-election periods? The central argument of this article is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decision-making powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious to suggest that incumbents use election violence in an effort to fend off threats to their power, it is not obvious how to gauge these threats. Thus, a central objective of this article is to identify sources of information about the incumbent's popularity that can help predict the likelihood of election violence. The observable implications of this argument are tested using newly available cross-national evidence on elections, government use of pre- and post-election violence, and post-election protests from 1981 to 2004.},
url_Publication={http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9090389&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0007123412000671},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53268/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Jablonski,%20R_When%20governments%20resort_Jablonski_When%20governments%20resort_2016.pdf},
url_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/BJPS+replication+files.zip},
url_Blog_Post={http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/30/what-makes-some-elections-violent/}

}

When are governments most likely to use election violence, and what factors can mitigate government incentives to resort to violence? How do the dynamics of election violence differ in the pre- and post-election periods? The central argument of this article is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decision-making powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious to suggest that incumbents use election violence in an effort to fend off threats to their power, it is not obvious how to gauge these threats. Thus, a central objective of this article is to identify sources of information about the incumbent's popularity that can help predict the likelihood of election violence. The observable implications of this argument are tested using newly available cross-national evidence on elections, government use of pre- and post-election violence, and post-election protests from 1981 to 2004.

@article{jablonski2014aid,
  title={How Aid Target Votes: The Effect of Electoral Strategies on the Distribution of Foreign Aid},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan},
  journal={World Politics},
  volume={66},
  number={2},
  pages={293-330},
  year={2014},
abstract={Despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage, little is known about how recipient governments' electoral incentives influence aid spending. This article proposes a distributional politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters, allowing governments to translate aid into votes. To evaluate this argument, the author codes data on the spatial distribution of multilateral donor projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010 and shows that Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters, a bias that holds for each of Kenya's last three regimes. He confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote share. This evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes.},
url_Publication={http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9216103&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0043887114000045},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53267/},
url_SI={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/how-aid-targets-votes-supplementary-appendix.pdf},
url_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/BJPS+replication+files.zip}
}

Despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage, little is known about how recipient governments' electoral incentives influence aid spending. This article proposes a distributional politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters, allowing governments to translate aid into votes. To evaluate this argument, the author codes data on the spatial distribution of multilateral donor projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010 and shows that Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters, a bias that holds for each of Kenya's last three regimes. He confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote share. This evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes.

@article{jablonski2013political,
  title={The Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Oliver, Steven},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  volume={57},
  number={4},
  pages={682-708},
  year={2013},
abstract={Maritime piracy is a growing scourge on the international community—imposing large costs on maritime states and the shipping industry, as well as potentially undermining state capacity and funding terrorism. Using original data on over 3,000 pirate attacks, the authors argue that these attacks are, in part, a response to poor labor market opportunities. To establish this, the authors take advantage of the strong effect of commodity prices on labor market opportunities in piracy-prone states. Consistent with this theory, the authors show that changes in the price of labor- and capital-intensive commodities have consistent and strong effects on the number of pirate attacks in a country’s territorial waters each month. The authors confirm these results by instrumenting for commodity prices using monthly precipitation levels.},
url_Publication={http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/57/4/682.full},
url_Ungated_Paper={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/jablonskioliverpoliticaleconomyofplunder.pdf},
url_SI={http://www.ryanjablonski.comarticles/jablonski-oliver-supplementary-appendix.pdf},
url_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/Jablonski+Oliver+Replication.zip}
}

Maritime piracy is a growing scourge on the international community—imposing large costs on maritime states and the shipping industry, as well as potentially undermining state capacity and funding terrorism. Using original data on over 3,000 pirate attacks, the authors argue that these attacks are, in part, a response to poor labor market opportunities. To establish this, the authors take advantage of the strong effect of commodity prices on labor market opportunities in piracy-prone states. Consistent with this theory, the authors show that changes in the price of labor- and capital-intensive commodities have consistent and strong effects on the number of pirate attacks in a country’s territorial waters each month. The authors confirm these results by instrumenting for commodity prices using monthly precipitation levels.

@unpublished{JablonskiTracking,
  title={Using Remote Tracking Technologies to Audit and Understand Medicine Theft},
  author={ Jablonski, Ryan and Seim, Brigitte and Gibson, Clark and Carvalho, Mariana},
year={2023},
abstract={Medicine theft is a leading cause of inadequate healthcare. Audits of public health procurement suggest that up to a third of medicines go missing in several low income countries, disproportionately affecting those with higher health risk and poverty. In an experiment with the Malawi Ministry of Health, we employ novel measurement strategies and an experiment to determine the pattern of corruption and the effect of a policy response designed to increase the visibility of theft.  We placed tracking devices on 2,400 medicine deliveries that could observe their positions in real time. We assigned some medicines with messages about monitoring and the consequences of theft. Using these data, we provide some of the most comprehensive estimates to-date on the scale and consequences of medicine theft. We show that corrupt actors appear to select less observed sections of procurement networks and locations more proximate to smuggling routes. We also show that measures of theft are strongly correlated with patients' ability to access needed medicines from government clinics. Despite this, we estimate only small effects of our visibility treatment. Evidence from surveys with patients and public health officials suggest these small effects of greater visibility may be due to systematic weaknesses in institutional accountability mechanisms and efforts by public officials to circumvent digital auditing activities. We suggest that digital tracking technologies can be an important tool in preventing theft, especially in combination with efforts to bolster institutional mechanisms of accountability.},
url_Paper={https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2023/434-2},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/2611}
}

Medicine theft is a leading cause of inadequate healthcare. Audits of public health procurement suggest that up to a third of medicines go missing in several low income countries, disproportionately affecting those with higher health risk and poverty. In an experiment with the Malawi Ministry of Health, we employ novel measurement strategies and an experiment to determine the pattern of corruption and the effect of a policy response designed to increase the visibility of theft. We placed tracking devices on 2,400 medicine deliveries that could observe their positions in real time. We assigned some medicines with messages about monitoring and the consequences of theft. Using these data, we provide some of the most comprehensive estimates to-date on the scale and consequences of medicine theft. We show that corrupt actors appear to select less observed sections of procurement networks and locations more proximate to smuggling routes. We also show that measures of theft are strongly correlated with patients' ability to access needed medicines from government clinics. Despite this, we estimate only small effects of our visibility treatment. Evidence from surveys with patients and public health officials suggest these small effects of greater visibility may be due to systematic weaknesses in institutional accountability mechanisms and efforts by public officials to circumvent digital auditing activities. We suggest that digital tracking technologies can be an important tool in preventing theft, especially in combination with efforts to bolster institutional mechanisms of accountability.

@unpublished{JablonskiHealth,
  title={How corruption harms public health: An experimental impact evaluation of corruption in medicine procurement},
  author={ Jablonski, Ryan and Seim, Brigitte and Gibson, Clark and Carvalho, Mariana},
year={2023},
abstract={Medicine theft is a leading cause of inadequate healthcare. Audits of public health procurement suggest that up to a third of medicines go missing in several low income countries, disproportionately affecting those with higher health risk and poverty. In an experiment with the Malawi Ministry of Health, we employ novel measurement strategies and an experiment to determine the pattern of corruption and the effect of a policy response designed to increase the visibility of theft.  We placed tracking devices on 2,400 medicine deliveries that could observe their positions in real time. We assigned some medicines with messages about monitoring and the consequences of theft. Using these data, we provide some of the most comprehensive estimates to-date on the scale and consequences of medicine theft. We show that corrupt actors appear to select less observed sections of procurement networks and locations more proximate to smuggling routes. We also show that measures of theft are strongly correlated with patients' ability to access needed medicines from government clinics. Despite this, we estimate only small effects of our visibility treatment. Evidence from surveys with patients and public health officials suggest these small effects of greater visibility may be due to systematic weaknesses in institutional accountability mechanisms and efforts by public officials to circumvent digital auditing activities. We suggest that digital tracking technologies can be an important tool in preventing theft, especially in combination with efforts to bolster institutional mechanisms of accountability.},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/2611}
}

Medicine theft is a leading cause of inadequate healthcare. Audits of public health procurement suggest that up to a third of medicines go missing in several low income countries, disproportionately affecting those with higher health risk and poverty. In an experiment with the Malawi Ministry of Health, we employ novel measurement strategies and an experiment to determine the pattern of corruption and the effect of a policy response designed to increase the visibility of theft. We placed tracking devices on 2,400 medicine deliveries that could observe their positions in real time. We assigned some medicines with messages about monitoring and the consequences of theft. Using these data, we provide some of the most comprehensive estimates to-date on the scale and consequences of medicine theft. We show that corrupt actors appear to select less observed sections of procurement networks and locations more proximate to smuggling routes. We also show that measures of theft are strongly correlated with patients' ability to access needed medicines from government clinics. Despite this, we estimate only small effects of our visibility treatment. Evidence from surveys with patients and public health officials suggest these small effects of greater visibility may be due to systematic weaknesses in institutional accountability mechanisms and efforts by public officials to circumvent digital auditing activities. We suggest that digital tracking technologies can be an important tool in preventing theft, especially in combination with efforts to bolster institutional mechanisms of accountability.

@unpublished{JablonskiAidVotes,
  title={Foreign aid is neither a curse nor a blessing: Explaining the effects of foreign aid on voting behavior and accountability},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Seim, Brigitte and Ahlback, Johan},
year={2023},
abstract={How does foreign aid change electoral behavior? We provide a theory to reconcile mixed evidence. We argue that when foreign aid is seen by voters as highly politicized, aid can be a double-edged sword for politicians. The net effects of aid on elections will depend on the dispersion of aid and citizen beliefs about how aid \textit{should} have been distributed. To test our argument, we conducted a survey among 2,331 citizens around a sample of 180 schools in Malawi before and after the delivery of a highly targeted foreign aid project in the education sector. Additionally, we conducted a SMS-based information experiment which varied voter knowledge about the aid allocation process. In line with expectations, we confirm that voters who live in an area that receives foreign aid were more likely to anticipate voting for incumbent councillors and rate incumbent performance as high. Further, we show that aid increased the number of visits by incumbents and we provide anecdotal evidence of more credit claiming activity by politicians. The results of the SMS experiment, however, demonstrate that aid can also be a double-edged sword: when citizens learn about aid, but fail to benefit, we document a sizable backlash against incumbents. Citizens were less likely to be satisfied with or vote for incumbents in this condition. Collectively, these finding imply highly variable net effects of foreign aid on electoral outcomes. The study also implies ways in which donors might minimize adverse political consequences from aid delivery.},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/2611}
}

How does foreign aid change electoral behavior? We provide a theory to reconcile mixed evidence. We argue that when foreign aid is seen by voters as highly politicized, aid can be a double-edged sword for politicians. The net effects of aid on elections will depend on the dispersion of aid and citizen beliefs about how aid should have been distributed. To test our argument, we conducted a survey among 2,331 citizens around a sample of 180 schools in Malawi before and after the delivery of a highly targeted foreign aid project in the education sector. Additionally, we conducted a SMS-based information experiment which varied voter knowledge about the aid allocation process. In line with expectations, we confirm that voters who live in an area that receives foreign aid were more likely to anticipate voting for incumbent councillors and rate incumbent performance as high. Further, we show that aid increased the number of visits by incumbents and we provide anecdotal evidence of more credit claiming activity by politicians. The results of the SMS experiment, however, demonstrate that aid can also be a double-edged sword: when citizens learn about aid, but fail to benefit, we document a sizable backlash against incumbents. Citizens were less likely to be satisfied with or vote for incumbents in this condition. Collectively, these finding imply highly variable net effects of foreign aid on electoral outcomes. The study also implies ways in which donors might minimize adverse political consequences from aid delivery.

@unpublished{JablonskiMalawiElection,
  title={How do we know if an election is stolen? Identifying human error and fraud in the 2019 Malawian election},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Ahlback, Johan},
year={2023},
abstract={Voters and politicians often struggle to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent elections. This confusion undermines the credibility of elections and governance. We introduce several techniques to assess the causes of tallying error. Using these methods we revisit the case of the Malawian 2019 election, which was famously cancelled by the High Court due to widespread irregularities and accusations of fraud. We show --- contrary to the dominant consensus --- that the majority of these irregularities were plausibly due to human error rather than fraud. We show that patterns of irregularities are not consistent with common strategies of fraud, and that irregularities failed to significantly benefit incumbents. Further, using quasi-random variation in the administration of polling stations and allocation of ballots, we show that irregularities increased in proportion to the complexity of filling in result-sheets, suggesting a dominant role for human error. In addition to re-interpreting a historically important election, we provide generally useful methods for assessing the causes of errors in election tallying. We also make a case that policy efforts to improve electoral credibility could productively be reallocated towards electoral administration rather than anti-fraud measures.},
}

Voters and politicians often struggle to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent elections. This confusion undermines the credibility of elections and governance. We introduce several techniques to assess the causes of tallying error. Using these methods we revisit the case of the Malawian 2019 election, which was famously cancelled by the High Court due to widespread irregularities and accusations of fraud. We show — contrary to the dominant consensus — that the majority of these irregularities were plausibly due to human error rather than fraud. We show that patterns of irregularities are not consistent with common strategies of fraud, and that irregularities failed to significantly benefit incumbents. Further, using quasi-random variation in the administration of polling stations and allocation of ballots, we show that irregularities increased in proportion to the complexity of filling in result-sheets, suggesting a dominant role for human error. In addition to re-interpreting a historically important election, we provide generally useful methods for assessing the causes of errors in election tallying. We also make a case that policy efforts to improve electoral credibility could productively be reallocated towards electoral administration rather than anti-fraud measures.

@unpublished{JablonskiFraud,
  title={How Violence and Fraud Neutralize Information Effects on Turnout: A Field Experiment in Uganda},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Buntaine, Mark and Pickering, Paula and Nielson, Daniel},
year={2021},
abstract={Information about corruption should motivate voters to show up at the polls to “throw the bums out.” However, this effect presupposes that ballots remains secret and that voters face a low risk of violence at polling places. Yet in electoral autocracies the accountability relationship can break down, since showing up to vote in support of opposition candidates may place a voter at risk of government repercussions, especially if votes are not expected to be private. Where violence and privacy violations are anticipated, exposure to information about corruption may have little effect on turnout. We evaluate this theory using a large randomized­ controlled trial(n=16,083) conducted in Uganda for the 2016 district elections. We treated eligible voters with factual, non­partisan information about irregularities in the management of local government budgets using SMS messaging. We find that this information caused the expected turnout effects, but only in the absence of nearby electoral violence and for voters who had relatively high expectations that their votes would remain secret. These results imply that electoral violence and privacy violations are key impediments to voters’ seeking accountability from their elected officials at the polls and suggest that repressive tactics may be particularly useful for incumbents when corruption is rampant.},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615},
url_Paper={http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/BJNP%20Corruption%20and%20Turnout.pdf?wp}
}

Information about corruption should motivate voters to show up at the polls to “throw the bums out.” However, this effect presupposes that ballots remains secret and that voters face a low risk of violence at polling places. Yet in electoral autocracies the accountability relationship can break down, since showing up to vote in support of opposition candidates may place a voter at risk of government repercussions, especially if votes are not expected to be private. Where violence and privacy violations are anticipated, exposure to information about corruption may have little effect on turnout. We evaluate this theory using a large randomized­ controlled trial(n=16,083) conducted in Uganda for the 2016 district elections. We treated eligible voters with factual, non­partisan information about irregularities in the management of local government budgets using SMS messaging. We find that this information caused the expected turnout effects, but only in the absence of nearby electoral violence and for voters who had relatively high expectations that their votes would remain secret. These results imply that electoral violence and privacy violations are key impediments to voters’ seeking accountability from their elected officials at the polls and suggest that repressive tactics may be particularly useful for incumbents when corruption is rampant.